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Abstract
To investigate the rise of economic abilities during development we studied children aged between 3 and 10 in an
exchange situation requiring them to calculate their investment based on different offers. One experimenter gave back a
reward twice the amount given by the children, and a second always gave back the same quantity regardless of the amount
received. To maximize pay-offs children had to invest a maximal amount with the first, and a minimal amount with the
second. About one third of the 5-year-olds and most 7- and 10-year-olds were able to adjust their investment according to
the partner, while all 3-year-olds failed. Such performances should be related to the rise of cognitive and social skills after 4
years.
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Introduction
How individuals make choices in the context of interactions
with other people is a major topic within economics, and thinking
from this discipline has strongly influenced research on decision-
making. Trading with multiple partners following different
exchange rules is commonplace in the dense social exchange
networks developed within human societies. When facing partners
offering different expected pay-offs, investors are expected to
optimize their satisfaction by adjusting their decision to the most
rational choice [1]. Despite the increasing interest of economists in
how adults and adolescents decide to invest according to the
behavior of other persons [2], we still do not know how this ability
appears and develops in an individual. No study to date has
investigated the competence of children to calculate investment
based on the offers made by partners.
Trust is known to represent a ‘‘social lubricant’’ in the economic
world [3], and most models of economic interactions have
demonstrated that decision-making is influenced by social
preferences such as trust and reciprocity [4–7]. The experimental
trust game, originally known as the investment game [8], has been
used in numerous studies to model the economic behavior of
people when trading. In this test, a player typically decides what
proportion of an initial monetary endowment will be given to an
anonymous player. This amount is then tripled and the recipient
decides how much of the tripled amount will be kept and how
much will be returned to the first player. Experimental results
provide evidence that decision-making is affected by cultural
origins [9–11], and individual factors such as gender or age [12–
17]. For instance, men from western societies invest the most [18],
[19], and therefore appear to be the most trusting [20], [21] and
the most confident in their investment decisions [22], [23]. Adult
subjects were also more confident than teenagers [17]. Several
studies have shown that reciprocity, trust and fairness affect the
decisions of children [24–26], but the influence of age on
investment decisions in an exchange situation remains little
documented (see [27]).
In every transaction, partners not only decide how to trade with
one another, but also choose with whom they trade. People may
consider alternative, better partners if the current partners do not
meet the expected cooperative conditions. In the context of public
good provision games, for instance, adults usually adjust their
investment following observation of contributions made by
partners [28], [29]. In the investment game, interacting several
times with the same partner can create a context in which
individuals develop trust in previously unknown persons. To
explain how trust relationships can evolve over time, researchers
have commonly used repeated games in which participants
interact several times with the same partner [30]. In studies where
subjects can choose their partner, results show that people prefer
partners who have already provided them with some form of
benefit, and the choice made is based on the past result of their
interaction [2], [31], [32]. In contrast, imposing exchange partners
on individuals may decrease the level of trust or result in more
time being required before participants trust each other [33]. As
trusting behavior evolves with age, older children may accept to
trade with unknown partners more easily than younger ones
would, or they only may decide to take part in the transaction once
they have estimated whether the partners were trustworthy.
When confronted by informants who differ by their level of
reliability, children consistently prefer the one having given the
more accurate information in the past [34–37]. Interestingly, an
increasing number of works examine economic skills and the
influence of partner’s reliability in non-human primates [38–41].
One study in monkeys showed that a single individual out of
twenty-one was able to adapt his investment according to the
profitability of two different human partners [41]. It appears that
taking the quality of partners into account when trading requires
complex cognitive skills. In humans, and especially in children, it is
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development of the cognitive abilities needed in any transaction:
giving to an unfamiliar person, judging the partner’s reliability by
reasoning about their mental state, and estimating the value of
goods [1], [42].
Studies have shown that children can spontaneously give objects
before the age of one [43–45]. By 14–18 months of age, they
readily interact with unfamiliar people [45] and take part in
exchanges with unknown experimenters [46], [47]. Progressive
development is also seen in attribution of mental states. At the
beginning of the second year of life, children can share goals and
read other people’ intentions, i.e., the plan of action needed to
reach goals [45], [48–50]. From 4–5 years of age, children start to
understand the beliefs and thoughts of others, which may help
them to recognize untrustworthy and dishonest partners [51–54].
Regarding numerical skills, children under the age of two can
make value judgments by recognizing small discrete quantities
[55–58], and larger numerosities, albeit in an imprecise way [59–
63]. At around the age of 2, they are able to count to about six and
detect a violation of counting [64–67], but children cannot master
the same counting principles as adults before six years of age, i.e.
the sequence of number words, the one-one correspondence
between objects and words, and the cardinal principle [68], [69].
By the age of 5 or 6, they solve verbal calculation problems
requiring arithmetic skills [70–72], although younger children can
already predict the outcomes of simple additions and subtractions
[73–76].
We aimed to identify the developmental stage at which children
adjust their investment in the context of an economic transaction.
We tested children between the ages of 3 and 10 in an exchange
task requiring them to calculate the amount of food items they
gave initially, in order to maximize the food amount to be
returned by two different experimenters. The experimental
procedure was similar to that used with monkeys [41]. One
experimenter gave back a reward twice the amount of the child’s
initial investment, whereas the other always returned the same
amount, whatever the child’s initial investment. To maximize pay-
offs, children had to respond in different ways to each
experimenter, offering a maximal amount to the first one, and a
minimal amount to the second.
Results
Returned Items
The mean number of returned items varied according to
individuals (F24,575=5.5, p,0.001; Figure 1), age and partner (3
years: mean number of sweets 6 sd=2.3560.09, 5 years:
m=3.0660.07, 7 years: m=2.5860.08, 10 years: m=2.7560.1,
F1,575=9.4, p,0.001; doubling partner: m=3.2960.08; fixed
partner=2.0860.09, F1,575=58.2, p,0.001). Given the interaction
between the individuals and partners (F24,575=2.7, p,0.001), we
compared the performancesofeach childaccordingtothequalityof
partners.
Comparing the performances of 3-year-old children according
to the quality of partners did not yield significant differences
(Figure 1). Children seldom returned all initial items, often keeping
at least one sweet (90.3% of returns).
Among 5-year-old children, five failed to adapt the amount of
sweets given according to the quality of their partner (Figure 1). By
contrast, three children showed significantly different behavior
with each experimenter. One of them adapted his strategy from
the first set of sessions; he quickly learned to give back a minimal
number of sweets (one) to the fixed partner, and a maximal
number (four) to the doubling partner. The other two children
modified the amount of returned sweets in the course of
experiments, learning to give one sweet to the first partner and
four to the other from the 8
th set of sessions onwards (Figure 1).
Among 7-year-old children, one boy did not display significant
differences in his behavior according to partner’s quality; he
returned some sweets to both of them (Figure 1). All the other
children were able to adjust their behavior according to the quality
of partners, most of them learning in the first half of the study to
give back a minimal amount to the fixed partner, and a maximal
amount to the doubling one (Figure 1).
Among 10-year-old children, one failed to discriminate between
experimenters; he repeatedly gave back around four sweets to both
partners. All the others adapted their return from the first sets of
sessions by giving back a minimal amount of sweets to the fixed
partner, and a maximal amount to the doubling one (Figure 1).
Net Incomes
By experimental design, a child’s net income should differ
according to the quality of partners. Only one boy of 5 years old
did not experience a significant difference of total income between
experimenters. For all the other children, income was higher with
the fixed than with the doubling partner (Table 1). The difference
between the numbers of sweets gained from each partner varied
from 14 to 598 sweets (Table 1). It is worth noting that by the age
of 5, children regularly counted the net income received during the
exchange.
Because some children were from the same school, we could not
control potential communication between them about experi-
ments, especially in older children. When looking at the
proportion of successful children tested at school versus those
tested at home who did not know each other, we found similar
proportions in decision patterns, both in 7-year-old children (83%
of success at school vs. 100% of success at home), and 10-year-old
children (80% vs. 100%).
Discussion
No 3-year-olds were able to adjust their behavior according to
the quality of partners. About one third of the 5-year-old children,
and almost all children aged 7 and 10 succeeded in optimizing
pay-offs by following different decision rules according to
experimenters. The fact that the performances of the children
tested at school were not better than those of subjects tested
separately at home casts doubt on any possibility of information
transmission between children belonging to the same school. It
should be added that successful children did not adjust their
investment according to the quality of partners from the first trial
of a session; they learned to maximize their pay-off after several
trials of the first or following sessions. Our results confirm that the
ability to calculate investment based on partners’ offers develops
between 4 and 7 years of age.
It is unlikely that failures observed in 3-year-old children were
due to their inability to differentiate between the food amounts
returned by experimenters, since children are able to differentiate
between discrete quantities from their first year of life [59–62],
[73], [77]. In the present study, children sometimes returned a
different number of sweets to experimenters, thus getting an
opportunity to learn that partners did not respond in the same
way. Despite having experienced a difference in net income of
about three sweets between partners, younger children did not
adjust their return according to experimenters’ qualities.
In terms of calculation skills, children aged 3 to 4 are able to
resolve basic subtractions that involve small number sets [70–72],
[78–80]. Similar abilities are observed in monkeys [81]. Here,
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monkeys tested in the same task [41] as they could remove part of
the items before investing, but failed to adapt their return to
partners. A single monkey out of twenty one was able to adapt his
strategy to both partners, which sets the performances of monkeys
somewhere between those of 3- and 5-year-old children. This also
suggests that calculation abilities may not be a limiting factor for
succeeding in such tasks.
In our experiments, children did not merely have to choose
between two options, but also had to draw different decision rules
from the contrasting conduct of two partners, which was more
demanding. The ability to follow multiple directions or to switch
decision rules develops slowly during childhood [82], [83]. When
asked to sort objects according to color, 3-year-old children are still
unable to inhibit this first representation when required to follow
an alternative one based on the shape of objects [84–87]. Our
study shows that adequate use of opposite decision rules is possible
from the age of 5, and is fully mastered from the age of 7.
Interestingly, 10-year-old children needed fewer testing sessions
(i.e. less than three sessions) than younger ones (i.e. between one
and five sessions) before succeeding. It cannot be excluded that it
was enough for subjects to separately adjust to each of the partners
they were faced with, without comparing their returns. However,
younger children failed in the present task despite the fact that, at
Figure 1. Number of sweets returned by children (n=8 subjects per age group). No 3-year-old children successfully adapted their strategy
according to the quality of partners. At the age of 5, three subjects adapted their strategy according to the quality of partners. Seven subjects
successfully adapted their strategy according to the quality of partners at the age of 7 and 10 respectively (Wilcoxon tests, n=10). Each plot
represents the mean number of sweets returned in one session of ten trials, along with standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033239.g001
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experimenter (see [50], [88]) as a partner requiring a certain
amount of food to give rewards.
The development of a theory of mind and arithmetic skills may
partly explain increasing performances in children. The success of
several 5-year-old children is consistent with the fact that 4- and 5-
year-old children understand that others may have thoughts and
beliefs different from their own [51–54], [89], and this ability can
be used to detect the reliability of a partner. With regard to
arithmetic, it is known that the first years of schooling markedly
affect the cognitive skills of children regarding language, literacy
and numeracy [90]. Although it appears sufficient to recognize
magnitude – even in an imprecise way – for children to adjust their
return to partners, the task may ask for a more demanding ability
when it comes to understanding the relation function between
investing and the return of each partner (when children have to
discriminate between ratio differences). School-related changes in
counting and arithmetic abilities may lead children to be more
efficient when calculating investment. We did not observe children
using counting to remove items before exchanging, but most
Table 1. Children’s net income according to the quality of partners and difference between the numbers of sweets received from
each partner.
Subjects Sex Net incomes
Difference between the number of
sweets received from each partner
P-value (Wilcoxon test,
N=10)
(mean number ± SD)
Doubling partner Fixed partner
Three years
Ste Girl 6.360.08 9.660.11 327 ,0.001
Aud Girl 6.460.07 9.360.10 286 ,0.001
Mil Girl 6.260.08 9.660.13 343 ,0.001
Cam Girl 6.860.14 9.060.18 224 ,0.001
Lou Boy 6.760.10 9.560.10 285 ,0.001
Sim Boy 7.460.10 8.660.14 114 ,0.001
Matt Boy 5.060.01 10.960.01 598 ,0.001
Math Boy 6.060.13 9.460.17 334 ,0.001
Five years
Chl Girl 6.860.12 10.160.15 330 ,0.001
Gla Girl 7.560.09 9.060.12 143 ,0.001
Mas Girl 7.860.06 8.360.07 49 ,0.001
Mar Girl 7.760.09 8.460.10 72 ,0.001
Mil Boy 7.760.07 10.860.09 306 ,0.001
Lea Boy 7.260.08 10.060.12 277 ,0.001
Lou Boy 8.060 8.0600 1
Ami Boy 6.760.10 9.460.10 275 ,0.001
Seven years
Ami Girl 7.460.11 10.660.10 323 ,0.001
Fat Girl 7.760.06 10.760.07 299 ,0.001
Ana Girl 7.860.06 10.860.07 303 ,0.001
Ass Girl 7.860.10 10.360.11 247 ,0.001
Ben Boy 7.960.04 9.860.14 191 ,0.001
Leo Boy 6.660.12 9.860.12 315 ,0.001
Art Boy 8.0601 0 . 6 60.10 262 ,0.001
Leon Boy 7.060.13 8.760.39 172 ,0.001
Ten years
Ali Girl 7.860.06 10.760.07 289 ,0.001
Aga Girl 7.860.06 10.860.07 299 ,0.001
Yae Girl 7.960.06 10.660.14 246 ,0.001
Mou Girl 8.0601 0 . 6 60.11 263 ,0.001
Flor Boy 8.0601 0 . 9 60.05 292 ,0.001
Yan Boy 7.360.08 10.260.10 286 ,0.001
Tho Boy 8.0601 1 . 0 60.03 299 ,0.001
Adi Boy 7.960.03 8.160.05 14 ,0.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033239.t001
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of received sweets at each trial. While Jordan, Huttenlocher and
Levine (1994) [91] found that counting objects may not be
necessary to solve non-verbal tasks, it could help children to
differentiate the net incomes received according to the quality of
partner and could improve decision-making. A marked increase of
performance in arithmetic problem solving is reported from the
age of 5 or 6 onwards [68], [71], [72]. Given this long age-related
development, it may not be surprising that children only solved the
task from the age of 5 onwards. Thus, counting and understanding
that people can think differently may improve performance on this
task.
Social factors could also have affected the performances of
children, and may explain better results found in 5-year-olds. In
particular, trusting behavior is commonly believed to guide the
choices of economic agents in investment situations [8], [92].
Repeated experiences can establish a trust relationship between
exchange partners [30] and this leads children to invest their
attention towards how to gain more from the task rather than
concentrating on the unknown partner. With increasing age,
children could also prioritize the potential to gain more, even if
they did not trust experimenters. On the other hand, it is possible
that the capacity of younger children to focus on the task was
impaired by failure to overcome their wariness of partners who
were unknown and potentially untrustworthy. A recent study
revealed that 3-year-olds evaluate trustworthiness of partners
based on the inaccuracy of information, whereas 4-year-olds rely
both on accuracy and inaccuracy [93]. As partners were always
trustworthy in our study, systematically giving children an accurate
reward, it is quite possible that younger children may have
experienced difficulty distinguishing between them. The number
of sweets that they kept could also reflect their hesitation to put
their trust in experimenters. Contrary to older children, 3-year-
olds kept at least one sweet in almost all the trials, thus showing a
preference to avoid losing their initial savings rather than acquire
gains. Such loss aversion relates to the endowment effect, a
cognitive bias commonly found in economics; it leads people to
attribute a higher value to objects they own than to objects that
they do not possess. A number of experimental studies have
demonstrated that adult investors may behave in a way that may
not be rational [42], [94–96]. Our results showed that children as
young as 3 years old also violate the predictions of optimal
decision-making models.
Although older children understood how to maximize their
benefits, they did not appear perfectly rational since they did not
follow an optimal rule on every trial. They often supported their
decision verbally by asserting that they preferred to win less for a
specific trial, or to set their sights on the contents of a cup that did
not contain the maximal amount of sweets. It should be
emphasized that children were rewarded regardless of the number
of sweets invested; no exchange also rewarded them with the four
sweets that they kept. The lack of negative reinforcement for
giving one quantity or another can explain that successful children
were not always optimizing investors. Such choices probably
reveal the importance of play or exploration in their performances.
The present results show that children between the ages of 4
and 10 are in the process of learning how to behave in economic
situations. Both cognitive and social factors are likely to be
involved in their ability to calculate their investment according to
the offers made by partners, and biases appear to influence their
decision-making. More research will be necessary to confirm the
present results in a larger sample of subjects, and further
investigate the relationships between cognitive development and
improving economic skills. In particular, it would be worthwhile to
study children in an experimental situation that does not involve a
social component, for instance, by testing them using two
automated dispensers instead of experimenters.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The project was approved by both the Education Department
of the Bas-Rhin (reference DIVEL1/09-670/IJ) and the district
inspector for education. Parents were given a letter describing the
general purpose of the study and written parental consent was
required for children to participate in the tests. Participation was
on an unpaid, voluntary basis, but children kept the sweets that
they won during the sessions.
Participants
We studied 32 children (16 males and 16 females) aged 3 to 10.
This sample was divided into four age groups of eight children: 3-
year-old (mean age 6 SEM=41.464.0 months), 5-year-old
(m=66.560.9), 7-year-old (m=88.063.6), and 10-year-old
(m=125.663.4). The sex ratio was balanced for representative-
ness; we tested equal numbers of girls and boys in each of the four
age groups, i.e. four girls and four boys. An additional child was
excluded from tests because he did not pay any attention to the
experiments.
Participants were European, from middle-class backgrounds,
with French as their first language. A majority of children
belonged to the Robertsau preschool and elementary school in
Strasbourg, France. We tested seven children separately (two 3-
year-olds, two 7-year-olds and three 10-year-olds) at their home,
i.e., outside the frame of the school.
Experimental Design
We studied children in two conditions involving different
experimenters. In the first case, the experimenter was a doubling
partner, meaning that she always returned twice the number of
rewards given by the subjects; potential rewards were presented in
four cups containing either two, four, six or eight rewards. In the
second condition, the experimenter was a fixed partner, meaning
that she always returned eight rewards, regardless of the number
of rewards given by subjects (one to four); potential rewards were
presented in four cups, each containing eight sweets.
Each child took part in two sessions, one session of 10 trials
each, with each of the experimenters. A session was composed of
10 trials separated by pauses of 5 sec. Children were given 5 min
between the two sessions to fully understand the different conduct
of the two experimenters. The net income, i.e. the amount of the
rewards kept by the children plus those received, could vary within
any one session from 24 to 48 sweets with the doubling partner,
and from 24 to 66 sweets with the fixed partner (Table 2). We
counterbalanced the role of experimenters, i.e. within each age-
and-sex group, one experimenter was the doubling partner with
two children, and was the fixed partner with the other two. We
also alternated the intervention order of partners from one set to
another. To help children learn to distinguish between both
conditions, we associated them with different cues. We divided the
table into two parts, each devoted to a different set of four cups,
with a different color for each condition.
Test Procedure
We recorded whether subjects had siblings or twins. We
videotaped testing sessions whenever written consent was ob-
tained. Children were tested individually in a quiet room
(4 m63 m) adjoining their classroom. The child was led to the
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then sat on a chair opposite the experimenters at a rectangular
table (0.8 m60.5 m).
Before testing, the experimenter gave the child the possibility to
exchange one reward for two. If they failed, the experimenter
repeated the trial once. If the child failed again, the test was
stopped. When the child was successful, the experimenter then
offered her/him the possibility of exchanging two rewards for four.
If s/he failed, we repeated the offer once. All subjects reached this
stage, and were considered ready for testing.
The two sessions lasted approximately 15 min. The first trial
began when the first experimenter (doubling or fixed partner)
placed and filled the four plastic cups with the different rewards.
The experimenter then gave the child four sweets by placing them
on the surface of the table while saying, ‘‘Here are four sweets and
here are more sweets’’, showing the cups of sweets. After 3 sec, she
pointed to the four sweets, held out her hand, palm up, in front of
the child and asked, ‘‘How many of them do you want to
exchange?’’ (Note that pilot trials run with children aged between 4
and 12 years revealed that the sentence ‘‘Do you want to exchange
any of them?’’ implied that the transaction may be risky, leading
children either to accept exchanging all the items or to refuse
exchanging any of them. We opted for a more precise question that
made clear that the children did not have to return all the items).
Every time the child returned one or several sweets, the
experimenter thanked them and presented the corresponding cup
to the child saying ‘‘OK, here are the rewards. Do you want to try
again?’’ before starting another trial. When the child kept or
consumed all sweets, the experimenter said ‘‘OK, you can eat/
keep the sweet(s). Do you want to try again?’’ After the session, the
experimenter said ‘‘OK, that was great. Now you’re going to play
another game with my friend’’. The second experimenter
(doubling or fixed partner) drew attention to the change of
condition by placing and filling four other plastic cups with a
different amount of rewards, and then began the second testing
session.
Control of Information Transfer
To avoid any exchange of information between children tested
within the same school, the experimenter asked the child not to
talk about testing with other children after the first two sessions
were completed. It is also important to note that younger children
were not verbally mature enough to have elaborate discussions
with school friends [97] about how to gain more rewards during
experiments.
Statistical Analysis
We used a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (Mauchly’s test
for sphericity=0.74) to assess the effect of the individuals, age, sex
and partner on the mean number of returned items. To test
whether subjects responded differently to the fixed and doubling
partners, we compared their performances at the individual level
using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test (exact procedure [98]) with
SPSS software version 17 (SPSS Inc., Chicago IL, U.S.A.). The
significance level was set as 0.05. Values are given as means and
standard errors of the means.
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